The general similarities that are customary in the commission of the nature of the offence are not permitted. [2] In the absence of a decision on a similar fact in a multi-count trial, the trial judge must issue instructions to warn a jury against misusing district evidence in relation to other reports. [5] 6 Although the argument against admitting legally admissible evidence necessarily depends on the particular case, some objections are likely to recur. First, it will likely be said that the admission of evidence will distort the process and divert the attention of the decision-maker by drawing attention to issues that are secondary to the issue to be decided. This is an argument that has long occupied the courts (see Metropolitan Asylum District Managers v Hill (1882) 47 LT 29, 31, by Lord O`Hagan) and it is often a strong argument, especially when a jury trial is taking place. Second, and again, especially when the jury trial takes place, it will be necessary to weigh the potential probative value of the evidence against its potential to cause unjust prejudice: unless the former are considered to outweigh the latter by a significant margin, the evidence is likely to be excluded. Third, it highlights the burden that an admission would impose on the opposing party: the burden of time, cost and human resources, which, in a case such as this, is very considerable to make the disclosure; the extension of the study with the inevitable increase in costs and the resulting stress; potential harm to witnesses who are asked to recall cases that have been closed for a long time or are considered closed; loss of documents; the disappearance of memories. It is, I believe, the recognition of these problems that has led courts in the past to oppose the admission of such evidence and, at times (as perhaps in R. v.

Boardman [1975] AC 421) to propose somewhat unprincipled criteria for their admission. But this case clearly shows how real these burdens can be. In deciding whether evidence should be admitted in a given case, the judge`s primary objective will be to promote the objectives of justice. But the judge must always remember that justice requires not only the right answer, but also that it will be obtained through a fair trial for all parties. If the existence of collusion smells of reality, there is a condition precedent for the crown to prove, after weighing the probability, that similar factual evidence was not affected by the collusion. [6] This decision is a useful example of the Court`s broad evidentiary powers and some of the factors it will consider in exercising those powers. Claimants cannot automatically rely on “similar facts” to support allegations that third-party experience in other cases constitutes evidence. Defendants facing claims based on similar factual allegations have a number of tools at their disposal to limit or exclude evidence and manage the impact (both in terms of cost and administrative time) of the dispute. Evidence of Similar Fact (FAS) is a form of character proof that refers to “extrinsic misconduct by an accused” and is considered impermissible.

[1] The SFE rule is described as an exception to the general rule against proof of bad character. [2] The Court also stated that even if such evidence were potentially relevant, it would have refused to admit similar factual evidence in the handling of the case for the following reasons: The question of admissibility should focus on the acts themselves and whether their similarities permit admission. [6] The question is better worded as to whether there was a “convincing degree of association between the similar factual evidence and the criminal offence charged.” [9] Collusion must be considered both in assessing the admissibility of similar factual evidence and in the reliability of the witness` testimony as a whole. [2] What would be called “generic similarities” requires less consideration. v Bank of Montreal, 2019 ONSC 7183. Mitchell J. concluded that the admission of similar factual evidence requires that the probative value of the evidence outweigh the strong negative effect of the inclination argument to which similar factual evidence invites.